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I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. ARMY DEPOTS 
The role that Army depots play in supporting the readiness of the forces has long 
been debated. The Army has built a massive depot system over the years to ensure that 
repair and maintenance to weapon systems would be available in times of national 
emergencies (Grier, 1994, p. 66). The Army depots fall under the command of the Army 
Materiel Command (AMC), and its Major Subordinate Commands (MSC) and are funded 
primarily from the Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF). There are many challenges that 
the Army faces in maintaining depot capabilities. Fluctuations in funding and work load 
make it difficult to predict future requirements and have a significant impact “in 
determining staffing requirements, improving efficiency and cost effectiveness of its 
industrial activities in order to maintain essential capabilities” (Warren, 1998, p. 6). Army 
maintenance depots “support the overhauls, repairs, and upgrades of nearly all of the 
Army’s ground and air combat systems, with work classified into two major categories: 
end items and reparable secondary items” (Warren, 1998, p. 12).  
Each of the depots have core capabilities based on their skills and facilities rather 
than work on a particular weapon system. In 1993, the Defense Science Board (DSB) 
endorsed the Pentagon’s approach of retaining core capabilities at the depots. The 
reasoning behind this endorsement was that the Pentagon could rid itself of duplicate 
capabilities and force the depots to review their costs and force structure resulting in an 
overall cost savings (Grier, 1994, p. 67). The defined core capabilities have not decreased 
the struggle that the Army depots have in developing cost savings. The shrinking budget 
and renewed calls to downsize, privatize, or close depots add another dimension to the 
efforts of making the depots cost effective. There is an idea that the Army could rely only 
on commercial sources to provide repair and overhaul capabilities needed to support the 
warfighter. The reality is that “private industry maintains capacity to meet current 
contracts, while Army depots must be able to meet day-to-day needs and instantly surge to 
meet wartime demands” (Butler, 2001, p. 71). Private industry is needed to help meet vital 
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wartime needs, but are not capable of meeting all the Army’s mission requirements on their 
own. As Maj Gen Richard N. Goddard, USAF (ret), stated, “Private industry is responsible 
to the stockholders, while depots must be responsible to the warfighters” (Butler, 2001, 
 p 71). 
B. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The Program Management Offices (PMOs) are responsible for a weapon system 
from inception through disposal. Part of their responsibility is ensuring the viability of the 
weapon systems, while maintaining the costs associated with maintenance, repair, and 
upgrades. The depots perform maintenance, repair, and overhaul on items that are beyond 
the capabilities of field maintenance activities. These higher-level maintenance functions 
would be cost prohibitive for the Army to maintain at the unit level. For Project Managers 
(PM) of weapon systems the key factors that influence their decisions are cost, schedule, 
and performance. However, the primary factor influencing the decision between using 
commercial activities versus depots is the cost of depot Direct Labor Hours (DLHs) and 
the impact on the overall weapon systems’ budget. 
The PMOs look at cost, schedule, and performance; however, a major factor 
influencing their decision is the legislative restrictions imposed by Congress. Under Title 
10 U.S.C., Section 2466 “Limitation on the Performance of Depot-Level Maintenance of 
Materiel,” also known as the 50/50 rule restricts the PMOs from outsourcing all of the 
overhaul/repair work to the commercial sector. The law specifies that  
Not more than 50 percent of the funds made available in a fiscal year to a 
military department or a Defense Agency for depot-level maintenance and 
repair workload may be used to contract for the performance by non-Federal 
Government personnel of such workload for the military department or the 
Defense Agency. (Solis, 2005, p.1)  
This allocation does not specify the number of assets but the dollar value of the 
depot-level maintenance and repair work that must be performed by an organic entity. This 
restriction forces the PMOs to look for the best value for their dollar while maintaining 
compliance.  
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C. WORKING CAPITAL FUND BUDGETING 
Established by Congress, Working Capital Funds (WCF) were implemented to be 
a more effective funding process to control the cost of a program and to account for the 
work that will be performed in and during the programs existence. Under the provision of 
Title 10 United States Code, 2208, “the Secretary of Defense may establish working capital 
funds to finance inventories of supplies and industrial-type activities that provide common 
services such as repair, manufacturing, or remanufacturing.” The WCF is designed to be a 
revolving fund with a goal of breaking even by returning any monetary 
gains to appropriated fund customers through lower rates or collecting any 
monetary losses from customers through higher rates. Revolving fund 
prices are generally stabilized or fixed during the year of execution to 
protect customers from unforeseen fluctuations that would affect their 
ability to execute the programs approved by Congress. 
The Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF) is composed of two separate types of 
funds. The stock fund is used to procure spare parts in volume for sale or inventory and the 
industrial fund provides depot maintenance, munitions and weapon systems component 
manufacturing and ammunition storage. Depot-level maintenance, repair and upgrade, and 
Army equipment reset programs restore equipment to a level of combat capability to meet 
the unit’s future mission requirements. The Army Working Capital Fund breaks out the 
reset process into three separate components:  
1. Replacement, which is the purchase of new equipment to replace battle 
losses, worn-out or obsolete equipment, and critical equipment deployed 
and left in theater, but needed for homeland defense, homeland security, 
and other critical missions;  
2. Recapitalization, which is a rebuild effort that extends the equipment’s 
useful life by returning it to a near zero-mile/zero-hour condition with 
either the original performance specifications or with upgraded 
performance specifications; and  
3. Repair, which is a repair or overhaul effort that returns the equipment’s 
condition to the Army standard. The budget incorporates depot workload 
assumptions associated with the Reset program consisting of Overseas 
Contingency Operations funding and peacetime training operations. 
(Department of the Army, 2014, p. 6)  
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Various factors influence the AWCF budget such as personnel, revenue and 
expenses, net and accumulated operating results, customer rates, appropriations and capital 
budgets. Most of the expenses for industrial operations are cost of labor and materiel 
consumed (Title 10, U.S.C., Sec 2466, 1988). The net and accumulated operating results 
measure financial performance between projected and actual outcome and are used in 
calculating future labor rates. The Industrial Operations group is the governing body that 
determines the direct labor hour rates that the customer is charged, which recovers all 
associated cost with both direct and overhead. By stabilizing rates, the customers are 
protected from price swings that would otherwise occur during the year of program 
execution. The “AWCF activities develop and maintain operational capabilities by 
acquiring or replacing production equipment, executing minor construction projects, and 
developing software” (Department of the Army, 2014, p.14). These factors influence the 
burdened labor rate that the depots charge their customers. 
D. OVERHEAD COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH DEPOT MAINTENANCE 
The depots are organized under the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and its Major 
Subordinate Commands (MSC) structure. Forecasting future workload is difficult with 
changing operational tempo and fluctuating fiscal year budgets. However, AMC and its 
SMCs must set the appropriate rates to recover costs and sustain underutilized depot 
capabilities. The costs associated with supporting the larger than needed infrastructure 
supporting the identified workload is then passed on to the customer.  
In most cases, the budgeted PM workload can be absorbed by the available depot 
capacity. Depot capacity is based on a one-shift, 8-hours, 5 days-a-week operation utilizing 
the available facilities, equipment, trained personnel, and workstation constraints required 
to perform the planned workload. The supported workload may exceed the program budget 
available from the PM due to overhead costs the depots have to recoup to maintain an 
operational capability. 
Indirect or overhead costs are “those costs incurred for the general operation of the 
depot and are not specifically applicable to any one product line, program, or contract. 
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Direct costs are associated with a specific final cost objective such as a specific defense 
contract” (Department of the Army, 2014, p. 56). Depot-level indirect costs impact total 
weapon systems costs. This impact, forces PMs to make sustainment decisions to ensure 
weapon systems cost are kept on target. These decisions affect the depots in terms of 
workload and maintaining capabilities. Indirect costs are difficult to manage with no clear 
relationship between expenses and depot financial health like material and labor costs. 
These costs can be discretionary, and with careful analysis can be reduced or eliminated 
based on the operating conditions within the Army depot (Department of Defense, 1994, 
p. 63-16).  
The Federal Acquisition Regulations define the elements that make up a cost 
objective: “The cost objective is a function, organizational subdivision, contract or other 
work unit for which cost data is desired.” The cost objective has all cost allocated to it 
including indirect costs. Direct costs are easily identified as any cost that directly attributes 
to the final product or cost objective and can be traceable to a specific contract or work 
order. “Indirect costs are any cost not directly identified with a single, final cost objective, 
but it is identified with two or more cost objectives or an intermediate cost objective”  Title 
48, Chapter 99, Subchapter Part 9905, Section 9905.502-30, (a)(2)). The indirect costs can 
be further broken down into fixed or variable costs. Some fixed costs include machine 
depreciation, equipment and inventory, and in the case of the depots general facilities costs 
such as security and firefighting capabilities. These fixed costs are described as “costs that 
are established on a total-depot basis with a broad range of activities and remain unchanged 
within that ‘relevant range’ or the levels of activity over which cost relationships remain 
constant.” Variable indirect costs are the utilities that are influenced by the time of year 
and the weather, or the wage differential for direct labor employees not engaged in work 
directly associated with a work order, such as when they are in training.  
The depot work force is broken into direct and indirect labor. Direct labor is charged 
to job tasks. Indirect labor includes management, material expeditors, engineers, planners, 
facilities maintenance, security, and other functions that are not associated directly to a job 
order, but do contribute to the depot mission. The indirect labor impacts more than one cost 
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objective, therefore their cost is distributed over all the production runs versus one. Also 
“indirect labor is one of the largest cost elements in overhead” and often account for 25 
percent or more of the total overhead cost (Department of the Army, 2014, p. 8). 
Additionally, General and Administrative (G&A) expenses represent the cost of activities 
necessary to the overall operation of the depot as a whole, but a direct relationship to any 
particular cost objective cannot be shown. Typically, G&A expenses include human 
resources, accounting, finance, public relations, contract administration, legal, selling, 
independent research and development, bid and proposal expenses, and an expense 
allocation from the higher headquarters such as Headquarters Management Fee. 
By separating out the operational cost of running the depot from the production cost 
of its program lines, efficiencies in the operations can be measured and costs can be 
managed and controlled. The premise being that if you are given a budget to work within, 
management is more likely to do a better job of planning and decision-making. When 
managers pass cost on to their customers, they are not held accountable for those decisions; 
the oversight is not there. Working under a fixed budget will provide a forcing function for 
management to look at consolidating processes and capabilities, instead of passing costs 
on to programs to provide a capability just for that particular program. The industrial 
processes and capabilities can be more efficiently shared by better planning and execution.  
E. DEFINING COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BURDENED LABOR 
RATE 
The burdened labor rate is the composite of all costs directly and indirectly 
associated with production of a weapon system, and many of these costs are not readily 
apparent. The direct costs are aligned with direct labor or “touch labor” and direct material 
costs which are tied directly to the end product. The indirect “costs have two components: 
production overhead and G&A costs, which account for approximately 40 to 45 percent of 
the total expenditures for organic depot maintenance” (Department of Defense, n.d.). These 
costs include depreciation, indirect labor such as supervisors, planners, equipment and 
facilities maintenance, engineering, and utilities. The Army separates depot production 
overhead into two separate categories: shop indirect and shop support. Shop indirect costs 
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are costs that occur within a work center (shop supervisor’s labor) that are not directly 
related to the components that are being repaired in the work center. Shop support costs 
are indirect costs that occur within the production division but above the individual direct 
work centers. The “Army system uses the same shop support overhead rate for all work 
centers within a production division” (Glass, Margolis, & Wallis, 1994, p. 2-4). Within the 
indirect costs, there is indirect material. This material cannot be easily identified with the 
end product without difficulty or undue cost, but is needed to complete the end product. 
The Army has included in the burdened labor rate General and Administrative 
(G&A) overhead, which are indirect depot costs that provide benefit to all production 
activities on the depot. The Army uses actual labor hours and also considers utility 
expenses as a G&A expense, and allocates the overhead charge to each Job Order Number 
(JON) on the basis of the budgeted rate (Glass, Margolis, & Wallis, 1994, p. 2-5). An 
operations overhead rate is developed by pooling all “costs incurred by the cost center plus 
the allocated share of the operational support costs of departments or service centers” 
(Miller & Vollmann, 1985, sec. 2). This allocation includes quality assurance (QA), 
calibration of equipment used by the depot maintenance that benefits two or more programs 
and machine setup costs (Department of Defense, 1994, p. 63-18). By doing this, the 
Army’s depots are able to project their workload in direct-labor hours and overhead to 
develop their overhead rates for the year of execution. This burdened labor rate changes 
from year to year based on the difference “between the actual overhead costs incurred and 
the overhead costs charged” (Department of Defense, 1994, p. 63-17). 
F. OTHER DEPOT ISSUES IMPACTING COSTS 
Garrison functions are normally borne by IMCOM, but DEPOT installations are 
explicitly excluded. The costs of fire protection, security, grounds and facilities 
maintenance, wastewater treatment and other IMCOM responsibilities are added to the 
burdened labor rates since in most cases the depots are the primary tenants on the 
installation. Most installation function costs are stable from year to year with adjustments 
for inflation; however, depot workloads fluctuate from fiscal year to fiscal year based on 
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warfighter needs, and budgets. This creates an unstable burdened labor rate that affects the 
buying power of the budget available to the PMs for weapon systems depot programs. 
Fluctuations in depot workload based on warfighter needs affect the depot’s ability 
to maintain their core capabilities. The programmed workload may not meet minimum core 
requirement sustainability; however, the workforce must maintain critical skills therefore 
the depot has to add their costs to the burdened labor rate. There are three general 
approaches that industry has taken to manage overhead costs effectively: “(1) analyzing 
which transactions are necessary and improving the methods used to carry them out, (2) 
increasing the stability of operations, and (3) relying on automation and systems 
integration. Of the three, U.S. manufacturers seem most enamored of the last” (Miller & 
Vollmann, 1985, sec. 4) 
A logical approach for improving capabilities, reducing costs, and increasing 
stability at the depots would be to right-size to meet a set of criteria. However, this approach 
violates statutes established by Congress to ensure a viable organic industrial base. Another 
approach to maintain existing critical and core capabilities is to automate the processes. 
With automation, the majority of the management comes from ensuring the correct 
machines and processes are available to support the projected workload. The limitation is 
the inconsistent nature of depot workload from fiscal year to fiscal year as well as un-
programmed workload. These limitations create the need for human intervention in terms 
of engineering support and touch labor, creating the potential of increased overhead costs. 
Depots were designed to favor effectiveness over efficiency, but declining budgets 
force a more equitable balance between the two, at time sub-optimizing both. This inherent 
inefficiency coupled with difficulty in finding candidates to backfill critical skills has 
resulted in the depot’s business cost rising. The depots also struggle to maintain their 
existing capabilities to posturing themselves for the future. It is difficult to find the right 
balance between sustainment and mobilization capability supporting the warfighter now 
and in the future without increasing costs.  
Within the government, competing needs have resulted in shrinking budgets. The 
need to sustain depot capabilities has offset the ability to fund research and development, 
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procure new weapon systems and upgrade existing weapon systems, which, in turn, 
undercuts the industrial base. This, in turn, threatens the depots’ ability to sustain 
capabilities needed to effectively support surge capabilities. The smaller budget forces the 
services to upgrade existing weapons systems to maintain their lethality in the current as 
well as future battlefield. These upgrades increase depot maintenance time, which 
influences the amount of direct and indirect labor hours needed for the weapon system’s 
repair or overhaul. The costs associated with taking a weapon system programmed for 
overhaul and upgrade and processing it through the depot resulting in increased lethality 
and capability has created an increase in costs. 
Finally, one of the biggest challenges facing the depots is the management of the 
Working Capital Fund (WCF). The WCF rates are set so that “the activity’s costs such as 
payroll, supplies, contracts, equipment, inventory, depreciation, and maintenance are 
recovered, there is sufficient cash on hand to cover operating disbursements, and it should 
break even over time” (Hinton, 1997, p. 6). The issue is that over time the WCF has not 
been able to operate on a break-even basis. Factors contributing to this failure have been 
the impact of “cost-effectiveness of depot maintenance operations, including inventory 
management practices, repair process, and readiness requirements” (Hinton, 1997, p. 7). 
Couple this with the materiel cost increase and the depot maintenance capital fund tends to 
generate losses. These issues reduce the buying power the military services have available 
through the O&M funds. What makes managing the WCF so difficult is that the business 
areas must develop and project their stabilized prices two years before they go into effect. 
This price estimation is based on customer input, identification of labor, material, and other 
costs. Any increase or reduction in any of the inputs creates a delta, which then impacts the 
breakeven projection. 
Furthermore, with excess capacity in both the organic and private industrial repair 
and overhaul capability, inefficiencies are created which further skew the breakeven 
projection. The organic depot mission supports the military customers’ programs and is 
designed to support surges, which creates some inherent inefficiencies. Some of the 
inefficiencies are due to the uncertainty of repair requirements and the necessity for the 
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depots to maintain capabilities for items that may be obsolete or have a low fleet level 
(Hinton, 1997, p. 33). These factors further exasperate the cost of doing business at the 
depots making it difficult for the depots to compete with their commercial counterparts. 
In looking at the challenges that all of the factors influencing the depots cost, the 
challenge becomes trying to find a way to make the depots cost structure similar to their 
commercial counterparts. Because the depots are a government entity, they are not allowed 
to make a profit like the private sector is; however, they can look at ways of creating 
efficiencies that would make them competitive in terms of cost. In looking at the various 
factors influencing the costs associated with burdened labor rate of the depots, 
consideration should be given to centrally funding the activities that are not associated with 
the production of end products but are associated with the functions that are inherently 
IMCOM centered. The question becomes this:  Will centrally funding the IMCOM 
functions provide the necessary relief to provide the depots the competitive edge they need? 
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II. DATA, ANALYSIS AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY 
A. DATA INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS 
The Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF) budgets from FY2013 through 2015 
indicate that civilian end strengths in the industrial operations decreased by 133 positions, 
while the military end strength remained stable. During the same period of time, revenue 
dropped by $409.9M and expenses also declined by $671.9M (Department of Defense, 
2015). During the same period, the hourly rate increased by $11.86 per hour or an 8.72% 
increase over three fiscal years. The depots have not received any direct appropriations to 
offset costs that could impact customer cost. The depots recoup their depreciation expenses 
for capital projects through the rates they charge the customers. The Industrial Operations’ 
capital budget from FY2013 through FY2015 totaled $442.7M and is depreciated at the 
rate of 9.71 percent over 17 years (Department of Defense, 2015). 
The AWCF budget estimate for FY2015 was submitted to Congress in March 2014. 
The budget estimated provided the Net Operation Results (NOR) and the Accumulated 
Operating Results (AOR) of the Industrial base. These financial measures provide the 
activities’ gains and losses within a single fiscal year while measuring how close to the 
budget the activities are performing (Department of the Army, 2014, p. 43). The differences 
are used to calculate the future years’ burdened labor rate. Activities will charge the 
customers to ensure the AWCF operates as close to a balanced fund as it was intended. 
With this information the working groups within the Organic Industrial base are able to 
breakdown costs associated with the burdened labor rate and establish the rate that the 
customer is charged. 
The U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency’s Force Management System 
website provided a breakdown of the subject depots workforce make up. This information 
was used to identify workforce alignment between production and installation positions. 
The labor cost analysis uses step 5 pay rate for the General Schedule (GS) employees and 
the Wage Grade (WG) employees. This provided a labor cost estimate for both 
installations. This information coupled with information extracted from the Office of the 
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Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) March 2014 Operations and Maintenance 
Overview of the FY2015 Budget Estimates gives a baseline for determining the effect of 
centrally funding garrison type functions at the two depots. 
The hypothesis is that by separately funding the depot’s garrison functions and 
removing these associated costs from the burdened labor rate the customer will benefit 
sufficiently to warrant implementation. To test this hypothesis, the cost data was extracted 
from the 2001 and 2005 budgets and separated into base operation and mission functions. 
This gave a percentage of the budgets dedicated to base operations and mission functions. 
With this percentage breakdown, the analysis of the 2015 budget and burdened labor rates 
could be analyzed providing a comparison of burdened labor rates with and without the 
base operations labor included. The resulting data provides a reasonable trend assumption 
on the burdened labor rate projections, providing a basis for determining the value of 
centrally funding garrison functions and the benefit to the customer in terms of reduced 
burdened labor rate. 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) publishes the “Models Used by the 
Military Services to Develop Budget for Activities Associated with Operational 
Readiness.” The information in this publication provides a breakdown of depot 
maintenance funding requirements by land forces. The use of the CBO’s model and using 
the FY2015 budget proposal allowed for the validation of the overall costs for the depot 
maintenance projects. This information provides the basis for determining the potential 
cost saving of centrally funding the garrison functions.  
The Department of Defense defines indirect costs as “costs incurred for the general 
operation of the business and are not specifically applicable to any one product line, 
program, or contract” (Cash, 2001, p. 1-2). It further defines it as being associated with a 
“specific final cost objective” (Cash, 2001, p. 1-2). Indirect cost make up a significant 
portion of the weapon systems’ costs and tend to be discretionary in nature and subject to 
reduction or elimination. Depot indirect costs affect the buying power of the customer and 
there must be a willingness on the part of the Army to reduce the burdened labor rate to 
include centrally funding IMCOM related functions. 
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Defining cost functions, direct and indirect costs associated with depot activities 
helps to understand the associated cost objectives. The difficulty is classifying the costs 
appropriately. The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FARs) clarify the cost objectives, 
direct cost, and indirect cost. FAR 31.001, “defines a cost objective as a function, 
organizational subdivision, contract or other work unit for which cost data are derived and 
for which provisions are made to accumulate and measure the costs of processes, products, 
jobs, capitalized projects, etc.” A final cost objective has both direct and indirect costs 
allocated to it (Cash, 2001, p. 2-1). 
FAR 31.202 defines direct cost as “any cost that can be identified specifically with a 
particular final cost objective.” Direct costs include material costs directly associated with 
the product and used in making it. Labor associated with direct cost is not limited to touch 
labor it can also include those tasks easily associated with the end product such as direct 
engineering. Direct costs are further complicated by adding costs that are not material or 
labor but do have properties that may not be a physical or visual part of the completed 
product, these are referred to as Other Direct Costs (ODC). 
OMB Circular A-122 (CFR Part 230) defines an indirect cost, as “costs that have 
been incurred for common or joint objectives and cannot be readily identified with a 
particular final cost objective.” At the depot level, the indirect cost is broken down into 
product related operational indirect and garrison indirect. Production related indirect costs 
“include salaries of supervisors, foremen, and other indirect employees, non-productive 
time of direct employees, and fringe benefits” as well as other costs (Cash, 2001, p. 2-3). 
Indirect costs can be fixed which are relatively constant and tend to relate to capacity, but 
include building and machinery depreciation. Other overhead pool cost include 
administration, tool cribs, machine maintenance, supervision, lubricants, consumables and 
cleaning supplies that are not readily identified to one product line and must be spread over 
all work load. The basic formula for all indirect cost rate is: 
Rate = Indirect Cost Pool Expenses / Allocation Base 
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The allocation base is defined as the number of direct labor hours available or 
estimated for a contract or program. The depots consider one man-year as 1615 hours for 
direct labor and 465 hours as indirect costs associated with production. The garrison costs 
are all indirect and for the purpose of the burdened labor rate are calculated at 2080 hours 
per one man-year. The garrison costs including labor, equipment lease, depreciation, 
maintenance, and material cost are incorporated into the burdened labor rate as Base 
Operating Cost (BOC). 
The Army bases the burdened labor rate for non-supply management activity 
groups including depot maintenance on “identified output measures or representative 
outputs. The output measures establish fully burdened rates per output, such as cost per 
direct labor hour, cost per product, cost per item shipped, etc.” (GAO/T-NSIAD/AIMD-
97-152, 1997). The depot defines that burdened labor rate using the same process. The 
depots take the various Program Management Offices fiscal year requirements for 
overhaul, repair, or recapitalization, look at available man-hours and projected previous 
fiscal year carryover to determine the burdened labor rate.  
The burdened labor rate changes each fiscal year. The reason for the change is based 
on the AWCF’s principle of a zero-balance target. When the depots costs exceed the 
projects, the next fiscal year the burdened labor rate will be increased to bring the balance 
back to zero. Conversely, if the burdened labor rate charged generates a surplus, the next 
fiscal year will have a reduced burdened labor rate.  
The Army’s projected decrease in direct labor hours for FY2015 did not occur, but 
remained relatively high to complete the work carried over from previous fiscal years. 
From FY 2013 to FY 2015 the Army’s Industrial Operations DLH for DA civilians 
increased from 18.71M DLHs to 18.94 DLHs (Table 1), while overtime was reduce from 
2.06M to 1.40M and contractor DLHs when from 2.72M to 1.78M resulting in an overall 
reduction of 2.43M DLHs (GAO/T-NSIAD/AIMD-97-152, 1997). 
 
 15 
Table 1.   Direct Labor Hours 
 
The “stabilized workload is comprised of direct labor, material costs, and overhead 
costs (mission indirect and non-mission indirect costs) and accumulated operating result 
adjustments that are designed to return gains and recover losses” (Department of the Army, 
2014, p. 55). In the case of the FY 2015 budget, the composite revenue rate was set at 
$145.87 per man hour and projected to  
return $102.3 million of prior year accumulated operating results (AOR). 
But unlike the composite revenue rate, which is adjusted for the AOR and 
applied to only new rate stabilized workload, the unit cost per direct labor 
hour represents total cost of work performed on both prior year and current 
year orders. The return of operating gains to the customers causes the 
revenue rate to be lower than unit cost. (Department of the Army, 2014, p. 
56) 
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Table 2.   Direct Labor Hour Rate 
  FY 2013 FY2014 FY2015 
Composite Revenue Rate per DLH $136.01  $141.45  $145.87  
Unit Cost per DLH $223.82  $223.72  $217.14  
Revenue Rate Change   3.85% 3.03% 
 
The “Industrial Operations revenue amount represents earnings from work 
performed on customer equipment. Total expenses cover full costs, including material, 
labor, storage, and other direct or indirect costs associated with the product being provided.  
In FY2015, the revenue and expense projections decreased due to declining workload.” 
(Department of the Army, 2014, p. 56).  
Overhead rates and standard costs “should not be confused with stabilized billing 
rates. These are used solely to price work to DoD-funded customers and may only be 
changed upon approval of the office of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense. All 
indirect costs shall be allocated to job orders by the use of an operations overhead rate and 
a G&A rate” (Hazelton, 2016, p. 1). The overhead rate is determined for every cost center 
that performs direct labor in accomplishing depot maintenance. 
$136.01 $141.45 $145.87 







FY 2013 FY2014 FY2015
Direct Labor Hour Rate
Composite Revenue Rate per DLH Unit Cost per DLH
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The working capital funds concept has “not accomplished the goal of operating on 
a break-even basis. As a result, to ensure that cash balances remain positive, the funds 
advance bill their customers” (Hazelton, 2016, p. 1). There are several factors influencing 
depot maintenance including excess capacity, material costs increases, and reductions in 
military purchasing power through the operations and maintenance funds, and the cost of 
maintaining an aging infrastructure within the depots themselves. The two depots that were 
analyzed in this study were both stood up in the early 1940s to support World War II efforts. 
Even with upgrades through the years, the cost of sustaining the older facilities and 
infrastructure require more time and effort to maintain. Other factors that have influenced 
the “cost-effectiveness of depot maintenance operations include inventory management 
practices, repair processes, and readiness requirements” (Hinton, 1997, p. 5). These costs 
have to be passed on to the customer; however, centrally, funding garrison functions has 
the potential of reducing the burdened labor rate charged to the customer. By removing the 
costs of garrison operations from the burdened labor rate, it would force the depots to look 
at their processes and initiate ways to more effectively complement the dynamics of the 
depot operations while reducing the costs to the customer. 
Future fiscal year WCF prices are established based on the projected outcomes of 
the current fiscal year with the intent of creating a zero balance. It is difficult to accurately 
predict the costs associated with materiel expenditures and the stability of the program 
workloads. The workload fluctuation based on the warfighter needs and available budget. 
This instability translates into a burdened labor rate that changes from year to year, which 
in turn influences PM decisions. Central funding of the garrison functions will eliminate 
one cost that can adversely impact the WCF pricing strategy. Even though garrison 
functions tend to be fairly constant from year to year, elimination of that part of the 
burdened labor rate will allow the depot to focus on improving direct and indirect labor 
functions influencing the burdened labor rate. This reduction would give the depot 
operations the opportunity to focus on the elements of production related direct and indirect 
labor that would support a burdened labor rate that generates sufficient revenues to recover 
expenses associated with the repair/overhaul operations capturing the intent of the break-
even WCF.  
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The two depots that were studied are not managed by IMCOM, but the garrison 
functions come under the jurisdiction of the depot commander. This means that all of the 
garrison costs are allocated to the programmed workload as part of the burdened labor rate. 
Garrison costs are all indirect costs that include labor, facilities and infrastructure 
maintenance, and support equipment depreciation. TACOM LCMC Organic Industrial 
Base (OIB) breaks down the burdened labor rate into the following categories, Direct 
Labor; Direct Materials; Direct Other; Mission Indirect (Within Shop and Above Shop): 
BOC (Base Operating Costs): and G&A which is then totaled and adjusted with a surcharge 
produce the stabilized rate for the installation (Hazelton, 2016, p. 1).  Table 3 shows the 
breakdown of Anniston’s and Red River’s burdened labor rate for fiscal years 2015 through 
2017. 
Table 3.   Burdened Labor Rate Breakdown by Installation for Fiscal Years 
2015 through 2017 
 
The mission indirect at Anniston was broken down further to “Within Shop” and 
“Above Shop” which averaged out of the three years to be 26.31 percent Within Shop and 
73.69 percent “Above Shop.” Taking the above shop cost and adding in the BOC and the 
G&A costs the garrison costs were calculated for each of the fiscal years and allows for an 
estimate of what portion of the burdened labor rate is considered garrison oriented. Based 
on the average cost distribution over the three fiscal years, the garrison overhead is 42.21 
percent of the total cost for Anniston’s burdened labor rate and 46.29 percent for Red River. 
Stabilized
Rate
FY15 $36.97 $79.94 $0.36 $50.68 $25.12 $0.00 $193.07 ($22.80) $170.27 
FY16 $40.90 $65.14 $0.77 $55.72 $31.49 $0.00 $194.02 ($28.00) $166.03 
FY17 $39.21 $68.77 $2.84 $51.55 $30.10 $0.00 $192.47 ($22.20) $170.27 
Stabilized
Rate
FY15 $43.52 $42.37 $3.19 $45.79 $32.15 $0.00 $167.02 ($1.14) $165.88 
FY16 $40.35 $37.40 $13.21 $42.04 $32.92 $6.16 $172.08 $0.00 $172.08 
























Both Anniston Army Depot and Red River Army Depot are manned similarly while 
ANAD’s workforce is larger overall. They have direct labor, indirect labor production 
related and indirect labor garrison focused. Table 4 gives the workforce breakdown for 
both installations.  
Table 4.   Workforce Breakdown of Depot Labor. Adapted from AMC 
(2017).  


















ANAD 2586 1350 52.20% 670 25.19% 566 21.89% 
RRAD 1956 947 48.42% 506 25.87% 503 25.72% 
 
The percentage of the total workforce that is involved in garrison activities is 
21.89% for ANAD and 25.72% for RRAD while overall labor for production or 
production related activities makes up 78.11% and 74.79%, respectively. In order to 
understand the differences in percentage between ANAD and RRAD garrison labor, their 
garrison work force has to be broken down by functions. 
B. BUDGETING AND FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY 
By separating the garrisons operation cost from the customers overhead cost, it will 
give the depot managers direct responsibility and accountability for allocating those funds 
to best meet competing requirements. This will provide greater visibility of how those 
funds were used, thus driving efficiency into the process. With depot managers being held 
as the fiduciary owner, it will help ensure that the focus of public sector budgeting should 
be to obtain the best value for the agency and the taxpayers.  
Financial management of Army depots is similar to financial management of 
commercial companies in many respects. However, there are key differences that change 
the focus of depot managers. A for profit business focuses on profits and maximizing value. 
Whereas, an Army depot’s primary goal is to provide a function needed to sustain essential 
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Army equipment. As an Army depot is essentially a not-for-profit organization, and its 
funding is earmarked for specific programs, it lacks financial flexibility and is dependent 
on resources provided by the DoD budget as determined by Congress. The funding 
resources provided come from portions of the budget, and are directed towards providing 
set funding amounts to specific programs. Thus, the depots must demonstrate their 
stewardship of the funding allocated for these specific programs, and those dollars must be 
used for that purpose and not be diverted to cover other cost/programs. The management 
and reporting activities of the depots must emphasize good stewardship for all allocated 
funding. The depot management teams must ensure that the funding they received to 
operate a program is used appropriately and as directed by the Congress. Planning a budget 
and managing within the funding restraints of that budget, are extremely important 
activities for a defense organization. The depots have to be cognizant as to whether they 
have the funding required to meet the needs of its program customers. Funding is extremely 
challenging to predict, as programs are cancelled, quantities are changed or new programs 
are started that were not forecasted. Also, there are depot functions rely on AWCF revenue 
from the repair or overhaul of down parts that then are returned to the supply system. If the 
number of repair parts that were predicted for the year decreases, then the funding 
decreases accordingly. This along with other program changes make it difficult for the 
depots to forecast their funding requirements reliably year to year. For these reasons, 
getting control over all cost that are associated with operating a depot is an extremely 
important function. 
The scope and size of a depot’s programs determine the complexity of its budgets. 
A depot’s budget comprises all the programs, plans and objectives that management 
foresees and implements over a fiscal year, and covers all phases of depot operations. The 
depots priorities and programs need to be balanced in order to operate an effective budget. 
The depot’s management team needs to effectively utilize the capabilities it has and the 
available resources to provide the largest impact to as many programs that are anticipated 
for that fiscal year. If a depot’s DLH rate changes during the fiscal year, it has to change 
the amount charged to their customers which may have a negative effect as cost go up or a 
positive effect if costs go down. The approved budget should be used by upper management 
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as a tool to gauge their operational performance. When management examines their budget, 
they should be looking at areas for improving processes and procedures in order to lower 
cost. Without active awareness of management at all levels, and their participation to 
carrying out the organizations goals, a well-planned budget is useless. Depot priorities need 
be established. Goals and objectives need to be clearly identified, as well as being 
achievable by the organization. Goals and objectives need to be measurable in order to 
determine if they are having the desired effect. Each organization’s processes and decisions 
must be evaluated in order to determine their effectiveness as well. Sub-organization 
should be challenged to prove that they are necessary, that they provide value to the 
organization and they contribute to the overall depot mission.  
A depot’s budget should be a complete and comprehensive picture of the overall 
required fiscal support, and its expected expenditures for a fiscal year. Because budgets are 
based and allocated by fiscal year and not actual requirements, managers at all levels should 
be planning for the future in order to prudently utilize the funding that becomes available 
to them. By looking ahead, depot managers could improve their planning and control with 
the intention of increasing the depots efficiency. Depot managers need to find the most 
efficient course of action through which their efforts will optimize the goal of meeting its 
primary mission of supporting the Army customer. Managers that budget for the future will 
help ensure the depot stays on its intended path, and will focus attention on gaining 
efficiencies on operating procedures and plant processes.  
A good budget and forecasting plan will help translate the objectives of the 
organization into actions that are achievable. It also helps to coordinate the various factors 
of production, with a view on reducing redundancy and gaining efficiencies. A good budget 
plan communicates to the organization the objectives being planned across the depot for 
that fiscal year. Performance for meeting the budget plan is the responsibility of the 
managers, and they should be held accountable for competitive results, not for meeting the 
budget. Depot leadership should challenge and coach managers, not command and control 
them. Leadership should provide goal setting, and milestones to gain and measure results. 
Strategic processes should be continuous and inclusive, not a top-down annual event. 
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Depot managers need to delegate, and give team leaders/workers the authority and ability 
to act on improvements that they may see can be attained from their area of expertise. 
Management should not be controlling and constrain the ideas that come from the workers 
ground up. Coordination between programs is essential to gain lessons learned and 
implement best practices. If each program is an island in and of itself, there will not be any 
cross coordination between organizations or interactions through process design and 
information systems. Resource management is paramount in a resource-constrained 
environment. Depot managers need to make resources available to operations when 
required. Lastly, depot managers should be tracking a few key measurements and controls, 
from all programs in order to determine what works best and what needs to be improved 
upon. (Bratton & Gold, 2007, p. 64).  
The budgetary process effectiveness is highly dependent on the extent that both 
management and employees buy into the goals that were established by the depots 
leadership. Depots leaders should recognize this when developing their budget plan. 
Leadership at all levels need to establish a culture and shape behaviors that promote the 
depot’s objectives, and stress that each organization can gain efficiencies with management 
and employee participation and empowerment. 
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III. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The data gathered in this research supports the hypothesis that the cost of centrally 
funding garrison related or base operations instead of passing those costs on to the customer 
will result in an adjustment to the funding and workload projections for depot maintenance 
activities. However, while the shift should result in the reduced cost associated with the 
burdened labor rate, the conjecture is that it will not be a one-for-one cost reduction as the 
current mode of funding the garrison function is to spread the cost over all of the projected 
workload. By implementing the change, it should allow the depots to focus in on the real 
costs associated with the burdened labor rate. 
Our research shows that by centrally funding the garrison or installation related 
functions at ANAD and RRAD the adverse impact to the burdened labor rate will be 
eliminated. By looking at the cost of maintaining the installation as a fixed cost to the Army 
this should allow labor costs to remain fairly constant and provide marketing abilities for 
the depots. The same would be true of routine and preventative maintenance activities 
associated with the day-to-day operations of an installation. With these changes 
implemented the depots can focus on improving those direct and indirect labor functions 
that influence the burdened labor rate and in turn create a realistic budget that will generate 
sufficient revenues to recover expenses incurred.  
The TACOM LCMC Organic Industrial Base (OIB) breaks down the burdened 
labor rate in the following categories, Direct Labor; Direct Materials; Direct Other; Mission 
Indirect (Within Shop and Above Shop); BOC (Base Operating Cost); and G & A which 
is then totaled and adjusted with a surcharge to produce a stabilized rate.  
Figure 1 shows an example of a Depot Rate Component break out. You can see by 
the chart that both Mission Indirect Costs and BOC as well G&A have a negative impact 
on the cost structure at the Depots. In this example, the costs passed on to the DEPOT 
equate to 1.493M for this hypothetical recapitalization effort.  
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Figure 1.  Depot Rate Component Breakout Example 
 
Another way to look at how these costs are broken out is by looking at the percent 
of total program dollars being allocated to the aforementioned accounts. Figure 2 shows 
that “Indirect and Direct Other” account for 26% of the costs related to the program are 
incidental to the program goals.  
Figure 2.  Percent of Rate Related to Cost Category 
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With this understanding, we can now relook at ANAD and RRAD rate structure 
and identify what the customer-stabilized rate would be if BOC and G&A were not part of 
the standard rate. Table 5 shows ANADs rates before the installation related activities are 
removed and after the BOC and G&A.  
Table 5.   ANAD Rates Fully Burdened versus BOC and G&A Removed 






Indirect BOC * G&A Total Surcharge 
Stabilized 
Rate 
FY15 $36.97  $79.94  $0.36  $50.68  $25.12  $0.00  $193.07  ($22.80) $170.27  
FY16 $40.90  $65.14  $0.77  $55.72  $31.49  $0.00  $194.02  ($28.00) $166.02  
FY17 $39.21  $68.77  $2.84  $51.55  $30.10  $0.00  $192.47  ($22.20) $170.27  
BOC/G&A 
Removed                 
  
  
FY15 $36.97  $79.94  $0.36  $50.68  $0.00  $0.00  $167.95  ($22.80) $145.15  
FY16 $40.90  $65.14  $0.77  $55.72  $0.00  $0.00  $162.53  ($28.00) $134.53  
FY17 $39.21  $68.77  $2.84  $51.55  $0.00  $0.00  $162.37  ($22.20) $140.17  
 
Table 6 shows RRADs rates before the installation-related activities are removed 
and after the BOC and G&A.  
Table 6.   RRAD Rates Fully Burdened versus BOC and G&A Removed 










FY15 $43.52  $42.37  $3.19  $45.79  $32.15  $0.00  $167.02  ($1.14) $165.88  
FY16 $40.35  $37.40  $13.21  $42.04  $32.92  $6.16  $172.08  $0.00  $172.08  
FY17 $44.20  $41.97  $10.81  $41.32  $38.36  $0.00  $176.66  ($6.24) $170.42  
BOC/G&A
Removed                   
FY15 $43.52  $42.37  $3.19  $45.79  $0.00  $0.00  $134.87  ($1.14) $133.73  
FY16 $40.35  $37.40  $13.21  $42.04  $0.00  $0.00  $133.00  $0.00  $133.00  
FY17 $44.20  $41.97  $10.81  $41.32  $0.00  $0.00  $138.30  ($6.24) $132.06  
 26 
The research shows that ANADs average rate over the three years defined was 
$168.85 a burdened hour, consequently, if the garrison or infrastructure requirements is 
removed from the customer rates then the updated hourly rate for ANAD would have been 
$139.95 an hour. The change for ANAD equates to a 17% reduction. RRADs average rate 
over the three years identified was $169.46 and if the installation related activities were 
removed from their rates, the new hourly rate would on average be $132.93 or a 22% 
reduction in costs to the customer.  
Customer costs can be further reduced if the workforce man hours related to 
garrison activities are removed from the burdened rate. We know the percentage of the 
total workforce that is involved in garrison activities is 21.89% at ANAD and 25.72% at 
RRAD. 
The following example shows how labor rates are negatively impacting depot 
customer retention. Red River Army Depot provided an update cost on a FY18 TACOM 
reset program for U.S. Army Reserve Command and the Army National Guard. The 
original total cost per unit determined in FY17 was $107,022, but in February 2018, the 
cost per unit was updated to $160,301. The main reasons for the cost increases were; 
increased parts cost, from $30K to $60K per unit, increased labor hours due to parts 
salvaging, and increased labor rates. As a result of the per unit price increase the Army 
Reserve moved their FY18 program to reset 40 pieces of equipment to a commercial 
contractor in the Texarkana area at a per unit cost of $117,143. The Army Reserve indicated 
that they are using the same parts price increase as RRAD ($60K) and the same statement 
of work scope. It was the labor hours and rate that became the issue. The cost savings per 




IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The focus of our research was to determine if changing the funding structure by 
putting the entire burden of facility maintenance and repair costs, infrastructure 
improvements, security, and protection on the Army’s Other Maintenance Army (OMA) 
account from the Other Procurement Army (OPA) account would save funding for the 
Program Office and increase the workload for the depots. After conducting the research 
using TACOM’s Anniston and Red River Army Depots’ production capabilities and 
burdened labor rates to test our hypothesis, coupled with the literature reviews, we have 
come to the conclusion that organic depot customers would see a reduction in the hourly 
costs to their program, if the garrison costs were transferred from the burdened labor rate 
to a separately funded Installation Management funding source. 
We believe that efficiencies can be gained and measured when garrison operational 
costs are removed from the burdened labor rate charged to the customers. The realization 
is that the cost of running the garrison is not being eliminated, but the money is being 
shifted from one line of accounting to another. By separating out the garrison operational 
costs from the burdened labor rate, charged efficiencies can be gained in the garrison 
operations as well as in production operations. The true cost of the daily operation of the 
garrison can be more effectively managed, and controlled through better planning and 
decision making. 
Separating the garrison specific costs from the burdened labor rate will reduce the 
burdened hourly rate charged to the depot customers, but will not eliminate all indirect 
costs associated with the burdened labor rate. The analysis of the labor breakdown for both 
installations indicates that the garrison focused labor force makes up approximately 24 
percent of total labor expended by the two subject depots. Taking into account not only the 
garrison labor but also the material costs associated with garrison operations, the savings 
will be passed on to the customers, giving the potential for increasing readiness by 
translating the budget savings into more weapon systems going into the depot maintenance 
program in any given fiscal year based on mission needs. Removing the overhead from the 
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fully burdened labor rate will certainly save money for the depot customers; howeve,r 
without a parallel effort to gain efficiencies within the operational side of the depot, it is 
simply moving the indirect costs within the Army budget. Within the depot operations, a 
concerted effort has to be made in identifying duplicate efforts, not only within a specific 
depot but also within the organic industrial base enterprise. By taking an enterprise 
approach, reducing duplication, and streamlining processes, the Army’s Organic Industrial 
base will be able to pass cost savings on to their customer base and in turn improve the 
overall health of the organic industrial base. 
Another benefit of removing the garrison operations costs from the burdened labor 
rates will be a better understanding of direct labor and material costs associated with depot 
production and those indirect production related activities that are part of the depot’s 
production environment. The management activities from the depots, Major Subordinate 
Commands and Army Materiel Command will be able to see how the burdened labor rate 
breaks down between the direct and indirect production factors involved in the depot’s 
production environment. This transparency of the burdened labor rate throughout the 
Army’s Organic Industrial Base can provide opportunities to improve efficiencies by 
taking the best practices of the different depots to create a standard for the organic industrial 
base as a whole. It will also be a “forcing function” for the management of the depots to 
look at how this will influence schedule and performance of the depot. These efficiencies 
in turn can be passed on to the customers, creating a better readiness posture for the 
warfighter. 
This separation of the garrisons operation cost from the customers overhead cost 
will give the depot managers direct responsibility and accountability for allocating those 
funds to best meet competing requirements. Providing greater visibility of how those funds 
are used thus driving efficiency into the process. Being able to see how program budgets 
are spread across direct and indirection production related functions will allow the 
production management team to make informed decisions that will best benefit the 
customers and ultimately the warfighter. 
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Changing the funding process for the Army’s Organic Industrial Base by separating 
garrison costs from operational (production) costs will be a challenge, but based on our 
research, implementing this change will reduce the cost to the customer, improve 
production capabilities, and identify areas for further investigation and improvement. The 
challenges will be to develop a strong budget program that supports the garrison functions 
being funded and for the Organic Industrial Base. It will require the Department of the 
Army to address how special installations such as the depots and arsenals are funded to 
support garrison operations. Some of the Department of Defense instructions and guidance 
will have to be changed to encompass the way garrison functions are funded. It will require 
lobbying Congress to change legislation on how depots and arsenals fund their garrison 
operations, and finally it will require a changing mind-set of not only the Organic Industrial 
Base leadership, but also the leadership of the customers of the depots and arsenals. 
While the implementation will be a challenge it is our recommendation that one or 
two of the Army’s Organic Industrial Base depots or arsenals be selected for a test study 
to prove or disprove how separately funding the garrison operations will improve the 
operational effectiveness of the Organic Industrial Base. We further recommend that the 
test case for the installation or installations be monitored for at least one fiscal year, 
allowing the garrison to operate under the independent budget through the four seasons. 
During that same period of time the production side of the equation will not only look at 
the financial savings directly associated with removal of the garrison budget from the 
burdened labor rate but how they can reduce those indirect labor costs associated with 
production. 
As part of the test case, the production operations of the depot or depots chosen 
would identify and track the cost savings being passed on to the customer(s), not only 
overall but by weapon systems that are going through their respective depot programs 
during the period of analysis. At the same time, the Garrison operations will also track and 
gauge Garrison operation costs in terms of labor and material. Because the depots and 
arsenals are special installations, the Garrison will also track how much of their facility and 
infrastructure work is depot operations related.  
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During this period of performance, it will be critical to receive feedback from the 
customers (PMs) on whether or not the change in costs will influence their future decisions 
on how to distribute workload based on the 50/50 share rule. The realization is that cost is 
not the only factor that influences a customer’s decision so the depots will also have to 
show improvement in schedule and performance factors. 
Our conclusion is that the funding changes suggested and the responsibilities being 
placed on depot management for dispersing funds will improve the depot efficiency, lower 
the cost to the customer, and improve garrison operations. 
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V. LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
Our study was limited to Anniston and Red River Army Depots, which provided us 
information on labor costs associated with Ground Combat Vehicle and Tactical Vehicle 
depot maintenance. It does not take into account aviation related depot maintenance, 
communications and electronics depot maintenance, or the arsenal operations that are all 
part of the Army’s Organic Industrial Base. While our analysis concludes that separately 
funding garrison functions at Army Organic Industrial Base Facilities will reduce the 
burdened labor rate charged to the customer, data from other depots and the arsenals could 
potentially skew that data to the status quo.  
We were further limited on the literature available on the subject. While there are 
several GAO reports concerning depot costs, there has not been an in-depth study of how 
the burden labor rate elements impact the cost to the customer. Other literature focused on 
the declining workloads, inconsistent budgets, and the aging work force not only in the 
Army’s depots but also across the DoD. The focus of most of these reports has been on the 
efficiencies of the depot operations. While our research is not groundbreaking, we feel that 
it provides a different approach to addressing the burdened labor rate issue.  
Another limitation to our study was the lack of historical data going back several 
years that could provide a basis for comparing pre-IMCOM activities on an installation to 
current IMCOM activities on the same installation. Historical data for the burdened labor 
rate tended to be scarce. 
Even with the limitations that were encountered during the development of the 
hypothesis and research, we believe that this document can be the genesis for further 
investigation into the operational and garrison relationship at Army Special Installations. 
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VI. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research is needed to determine if the separation of garrison functions and 
the workforce associated with garrison operations will lead to depot efficiencies in the areas 
of operations management, budgetary, performance, and effectively scheduling. These 
topic areas where not discussed in this paper. If a successful pilot study is implemented at 
one of the Army’s depots, it is recommended that this effort be expanded to include the 
Army’s Arsenals. 
Further research is warranted with senior leadership to understand their 
requirements for a long-term change in the Army’s Organic Industrial Base management. 
The current tour of duty for a depot or arsenal commander is two years. The officers 
selected to lead an Army Organic Industrial Base Depot or Arsenal usually come from 
soldier centric organizations with operational missions focused on combat arms, even in 
the support functions. They are thrust into an environment with little knowledge and 
training on how the industrial base operates where the workforce is overwhelmingly 
civilian and the mission is more production oriented. It normally takes a commander a 
significant amount of time before they become comfortable with the way the depot or 
arsenal operates. By the time they have their stride on the functioning of the industrial 
operation and are beginning to implement changes that will positively impact the operation, 
the Army is starting to select their follow-on assignment. Research is needed to determine 
if having a two-year tour of duty at an Army Organic Industrial Base installation is 
sufficient to foster the leadership necessary for long-term change or direction.  
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APPENDIX  
Title 10, U.S.C. Section 2208(j) Working Capital Funds (Subcontracting) 
(1991): The Secretary of a military department may authorize a working capital funded 
industrial facility of that department to manufacture or remanufacture articles and sell these 
articles, as well as manufacturing, remanufacturing, and engineering services provided by 
such facilities, to persons outside the Department of Defense.  
Title 10, U.S.C. Section 4543 Authority to Sell Outside the Department of 
Defense (1993): Authorizes a working-capital funded Army industrial facility (including 
a Department of the Army arsenal) that manufactures large caliber cannons, gun mounts, 
recoil mechanisms, ammunition, munitions, or components thereof to sell manufactured 
articles or services to a person outside the Department of defense with some stipulations. 
The proceeds from such sales are returned to the Working Capital Fund rather than to the 
facility that made the sale. 
Title 10 U.S.C. Section 2474 Centers of Industrial and Technical Excellence 
(CITE Statute) (1997): Grants authority to depots now designated “centers of industrial 
and technical excellence” in their respective core competencies to enter into partnerships 
with private industry. These partnerships offer unprecedented flexibility to the depots to 
perform subcontract work for private companies to use facilities or equipment at the depots 
for either military or commercial purposes. The subcontract work is related to the core 
competencies of the Center, including any depot-level maintenance and repair work that 
involves one or more core competencies of the Center. The objectives for exercising the 
authority to maximize the utilization of the capacity of a Center of Industrial Technical 
Excellence, reduce or eliminate the cost of ownership in such areas of responsibility as 
operations and maintenance and environmental remediation, and to reduce the cost of 
products of the Department of Defense produced or maintained at a Center. 
 Title 10 U.S.C. Section 2667 Enhanced Use Leases (2000): Creates incentives 
for both organic facilities and the private sector to negotiate long-term leases of public 
property in return for cash or in-kind investment in the facilities. The in-kind investment 
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includes maintenance, protection, alteration, repair, improvement, or restoration (including 
environmental restoration) of property or facilities. It can also include construction of new 
facilities, use of facilities, provision or payment of utility services and real property 
maintenance. 
Title 10 U.S.C. Section 4544 Cooperative Activities Pilot Program (2004): 
Authorizes all working-capital funded Army industrial facilities (arsenals, ammunition 
plants, depots, or “a manufacturing plant”) to enter into a variety of cooperative 
arrangements with “non-Army” entities. Cooperation can include direct sales or 
subcontracting by the Army facility, work share arrangements, and teaming to jointly bid 
on new federal contracts. The pilot program provides additional flexibility by allowing the 
Army facilities to inter into fixed-price and multi-year contracts to deliver goods and 
services, and allow the non-Army entity to make incremental and in-kind payments. This 
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